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Rational  Moral  Ignorance 
Abstract : What  should  a  person  do  when,  through  no  fault  of  her  own,  she  ends  up  believing 
a  false  moral  theory?  Some  suggest  that  she  should  act  against  what  the  false  theory 
recommends;  others  argue  that  she  should  follow  her  rationally  held  moral  beliefs.  While  the 
former  view  be er  accords  with  intuitions  about  cases,  the  la er  one  seems  to  enjoy  a  critical 
advantage:  It  seems  be er  able  to  render  moral  requirements  ‘followable’  or  ‘action-guiding.’ 
But  this  tempting  thought  proves  diﬃcult  to  justify.  Indeed,  whether  it  can  be  justiﬁed  turns 
out  to  depend  importantly  on  the  rational  status  of  epistemic  akrasia.  Furthermore,  it  can  be 
argued,  from  premises  all  parties  to  the  moral  ignorance  debate  should  accept,  that  rational 
epistemic  akrasia  is  possible.  If  the  argument  proves  successful,  it  follows  that  a  person 
should  sometimes  act  against  her  rationally  held  moral  convictions. 
1 Introduction 
What  should  a  person  do  when,  through  no  fault  of  her  own,  she  ends  up 
believing  some  false  moral  theory?  Should  she  do  as  the  theory  would  1
recommend?  Or  should  she  act  against  the  moral  principles  she  believes  in?  The 
following  example  illustrates  the  general  question. 
Frances’s  Dilemma : Frances  knows  several  diligent,  insightful,  and  well-informed 
Kantian  ethicists.  She  regards  each  one  as  trustworthy  with  respect  to  ethical  issues 
and  is  rational  in  so  doing.  On  the  basis  of  their  testimony,  she  comes  to  have  a 
rational,  but  false,  moral  belief.  Speciﬁcally,  she  comes  to  believe  that  lying  is  always 
wrong,  no  ma er  the  consequences.  The  next  day,  an  emergency  arises:  Frances 
must  decide  whether  to  lie  to  a  would-be  murderer  to  save  the  life  of  her  friend. 
Should  Frances  lie  or  tell  the  truth?  (adapted  from  Weatherson  ms.,  p.  12) 
On  the  one  hand,  there  is  pressure  to  say  that  Frances  should  tell  the  lie:  In 
general,  one  should  protect  one’s  friends  from  murderers.  On  the  other  hand,  if 
Frances  does  tell  the  truth,  a  compelling  defense  of  her  choice  is  available:  She 
did  what  she  believed  was  right,  and  she  had  good  reason  to  believe  as  she  did.  2
There  is  some  tension  here. 
1 Moral  ignorance  has  been  discussed  by  several  authors,  including  Arpaly  and  Schroeder 
(1999,  2014),  Arpaly  (2002,  2003,  2015),  Rosen  (2004),  Sepielli  (2009,  2014,  2016,  2018),  Zimmerman 
(2010),  Harman  (2011,  2015),  Weatherson  (2015,  ms.),  Hedden  (2016),  Pi ard  and  Worsnip  (2017), 
Johnson  King  (2020,  forthcoming),  and  Podgorski  (2020).  This  paper’s  focus  is 
narrower— epistemically  rational  moral  ignorance.  See  Harman  (2011,  pp.  460–463;  2015,  pp.  75–78), 
Podgorski  (2020),  Sepielli  (2018),  and  Weatherson  (ms.,  pp.  12–16)  for  relevant  discussion. 
2 One  way  to  react  is  to  deny  the  setup:  Frances  simply  couldn’t  have  been  rational  in 
believing  as  she  did.  This  reaction  might  be  motivated  by  a  certain  highly  demanding 
epistemological  picture,  according  to  which  people  are  always  rationally  required  to  believe  the 
moral  truth.  See  Guerrero  (2007),  McGrath  (2009),  Harman  (2011),  Sliwa  (2012),  and  Wieland  (2015) 
for  discussion  of  closely  related  issues.  For  the  purposes  of  this  paper,  we’ll  assume  that  it  is 
possible  to  have  rational,  false  beliefs  about  what’s  right. 
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Here  is  the  plan.  After  clarifying  the  question  at  hand  (§2),  we  will 
distinguish  three  candidate  norms  that  might  be  thought  to  apply  to  someone 
like  Frances  (§3):  the transparent norm  (which  requires  an  agent  to  act  in  accord 
with  her  moral  beliefs),  the translucent norm  (which  requires  an  agent  to  act  in 
accord  with  the  moral  beliefs  it  would  be  rational  to  have),  and  the opaque norm 
(which  is  not  sensitive  to  an  agent’s  moral  beliefs  at  all,  even  when  those  beliefs 
are  rationally  held).  The  transparent  norm  is  widely  thought  to  be  something  of  a 
non-starter  by  those  on  both  sides  of  the  debate.  So  the  chief  task  of  the  paper  is 
to  compare  the  translucent  and  opaque  norms,  with  respect  to  some  relevant 
desiderata.  On  the  one  hand,  we’ll  see  that  the  opaque  norm  more  faithfully 
tracks  what  a  good  person  would  do  (§4).  At  the  same  time,  it  must  be 
acknowledged  that  the  opaque  norm  seems  problematically unfollowable ,  in  some 
important  sense.  This  suggestion  will  receive  close  scrutiny  (§5).  In  what  sense  is 
the  opaque  norm  unfollowable?  Is  there  some  salient  standard  of  followability 
that  it  fails  to  meet,  which  the  translucent  norm  does  meet?  Ultimately,  the 
answer  to  this  question  will  be  shown  to  depend  upon  the  rational  status  of 
epistemic akrasia :  If  rational  epistemic  akrasia  is  possible,  then  the  translucent 
norm  and  the  opaque  norm  will—contrary  to  appearances—turn  out  to  be  on  a 
par,  with  respect  to  followability.  And  furthermore  it  can  be  argued,  from 
premises  all  parties  to  our  debate  must  accept,  that  rational  epistemic  akrasia  is 
indeed  possible.  If  the  argument  is  to  be  trusted,  it  indicates  that  a  moral  norm 
can  require  a  person  to  act  against  her  own  rationally  held  moral  beliefs  without 
thereby  being  unfollowable  in  any  useful  or  important  sense. 
 
2 Clarifying  the  Guiding  Question 
2.1 Objective  and  Subjective  Requirements 
Put  simply,  our  guiding  question  is:  “What  should  someone  like  Frances  do?” 
But  this  question  requires  clariﬁcation.  To  see  this,  it  will  be  helpful  to  consider 
one  very  simple  reaction  to  our  puzzle,  which  we’ll  call  the  ‘easy  answer.’ 
What  should  Frances  do?  That’s  an  easy  one!  Just  look  at  the  setup  of  the  case.  From 
the  setup,  we  can  see  that  Frances’s  belief  is  false.  Presumably,  her  belief  is  false 
because  one  is  required  to  lie  when  the  would-be  murderer  arrives  at  one’s  door.  So 
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Frances  should  tell  the  lie.  3
Though  tempting,  the  easy  answer  may  be  a  bit  too  quick.  To  see  why  some  have 
found  this  line  unsatisfying,  it  is  helpful  to  appeal  to  a  popular  distinction  4
between  objective  and  subjective  moral  requirements.  Alan Gibbard  (2005,  pp.  5
343–344)  characterizes  the  distinction  as  follows: 
We  can  ask  what  one  ought  to  do  in  light  of  all  the  facts.  Alternatively,  we  can  ask 
what  one  ought  to  do  in  light  of  available  information…  Standardly  in  moral  theory, 
we  distinguish  what  a  person  ought  to  do  in  the  objective  sense  and  what  she  ought 
to  do  in  the  subjective  sense. 
To  illustrate,  we  can  apply  the  distinction  to  a  simple  example. 
Doctor’s  Dilemma : A  doctor  must  decide  whether  to  give  a  certain  medicine  to  her 
ailing  patient.  In  fact,  the  patient  possesses  a  rare,  indetectable  allergy  to  the 
medicine  and  would  be  be er  oﬀ  without  it.  But  the  doctor  has  no  way  of  knowing 
about  this;  she  has  every  reason  to  think  that  the  medicine  will  help  her  patient 
recover.  Should  she  give  him  the  medicine  or  not? 
If  we  take  the  objective/subjective  distinction  seriously,  the  question  asked  above 
is  ambiguous.  Objectively,  the  doctor  should  not  give  her  patient  the  medicine, 
for  he  is  allergic  to  it.  But  subjectively,  the  doctor  should  give  her  patient  the 
medicine,  for  her  evidence  suggests  that  it  will  help  him  recover. 
With  this  distinction  in  place,  the  easy  answer  may  seem  less  appealing.  All 
sides  can  agree  that,  objectively,  Frances  should  tell  the  lie. That’s what  was 
stipulated  in  the  setup.  But  an  important  question  remains:  In  light  of  her 
information,  what  should  Frances  do?  This  question  isn’t  se led  by  the  easy 
answer,  and  it  is  the  question  that  occupies  us  in  this  paper.  6
3 Weatherson  expresses  sympathy  with  this  line  (ms.,  p.  12). 
4 See  Harman  (2015,  p.  58)  and  Sepielli  (2016,  p.  2952). 
5 For  a  sampling  of  authors  who  appeal  to  such  a  distinction,  see  Ewing  (1953),  Brandt  (1976), 
Pollock  (1979),  Unger  (1975),  Wedgwood  (2003),  Setiya  (2004),  Gibbard  (2005),  Schroeder  (2009), 
and  Harman  (2011,  2015).  More  recently,  some,  such  as  Pi ard  and  Worsnip  (2017),  have  expressed 
skepticism  about  ‘should’  or  ‘ought’  is  ambiguous  between  (exactly)  these  two  senses.  This  issue 
will  be  discussed  in  the  next  subsection. 
6 Given  the  distinction  just  drawn,  one  might  wonder  whether  the  moral  beliefs  which 
generate  our  puzzle  (e.g.  Frances’s  belief  that  she’s  required  to  tell  the  truth)  themselves  refer  to 
objective  or  subjective  requirements.  In  our  central  example,  it  is  natural  to  think  of  Frances  as 
having  both  of  these  beliefs.  But  we  can  remain  neutral  on  this  issue  more  broadly.  In  discussing 
the  Frances  case  and  others,  we  can  simply  refer  to  an  agent’s  “belief  about  what’s  right”  without 
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2.2  When  Should  We  Disambiguate? 
At  this  point,  a  distinct  worry  arises.  Though  disambiguating  objective  and 
subjective  requirements  may  help  us  disarm  the  easy  answer,  it  opens  us  up  to  a 
more  sophisticated  deﬂationary  a ack.  The  thought  runs  as  follows.  Once  we 
permit  more  than  one  type  of  requirement  into  our  normative  ontology  (e.g. 
objective  and  subjective),  we  arguably  open  the  door  for  further  subdivision. 
Why  stop  at  exactly  two?  More  pointedly,  in  our  central  example,  why  can’t  7
there  be,  in  eﬀect,  two  subjective  ‘shoulds’—one  which  requires  Frances  to 
protect  her  friend  and  another  which  requires  her  to  do  what  she  believes  is 
right?  If  disambiguation  is  appropriate  in  the  case  of  the  doctor,  why  not  in  the 
case  of  Frances  too?  Responding  to  this  line  of  reasoning  will  require  us  to  think 
more  carefully  about  when  disambiguation  is  called  for  and  when  it  isn’t. 
Consider,  for  the  moment,  a  sparse  normative  ontology,  one  which  holds  up 
the  objective  ‘should’  as  the  only  morally  important ‘should.’  What  sorts  of 
diﬃculties  does  such  a  picture  face?  Which  roles  is  the  objective  ‘should’  unable 
to  play,  if  any?  Two  ideas  suggest  themselves. 
One  potential  complaint  against  the  objective  ‘should’  is  its  failure  to  track 
what  a  person  of  morally  good  character  would  do.  When  we  say  that  a  person 
should  do X ,  we  may  be  saying,  in  part,  that  a  good  person  would  do X .  And  the 
objective  ‘should’  seems  not  to  respect  this.  In  the  doctor  example,  a  good  person 
would  surely  give  her  patient  the  medicine,  but  the  objective  ‘should’ 
recommends  the  opposite. 
A  second  complaint  against  the  objective  ’should’  is  that  it  seems  to  issue 
unfollowable  instructions,  in  some  important  sense.  If  our  doctor  were  to  see  a 
long  series  of  patients  (some  of  whom  were  allergic  to  the  medicine  and  some  of 
whom  were  not),  the  objective  ‘should’  would  enjoin  her  to give  the  medicine  to  all 
and  only  those  whom  it  will  help .  It  would  be  unfair  to  expect  the  doctor  to  conform 
to  this  rule. 
So  it  seems  that  there  are  at  least  two  important  roles  that  the  objective 
specifying  whether  the  belief  is  about  objective  rightness,  subjective  rightness,  or  both.  The 
arguments  found  in  this  paper  will  apply  to  all  varieties  of  case. 
7 See  Sepielli  (2014),  Pi ard  and  Worsnip  (2017),  and  Kagan  (2018).  See  also  Jackson  (1991), 
who  warns  of  “an  annoying  profusion  of  ‘oughts’”  (1991,  p.  471). 
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‘should’  manifestly  fails  to  play,  which  are  restated  below.  8
Role  1  (Character) :  T rack  what  a  good  person  would  do.  9
Role  2  (Followability) :    Be  followable  in  some  important  sense. 
Because  these  roles  cannot  be  played  by  the  objective  ‘should,’  we  have  reason 
to  seek  an  alternative,  a  subjective  ‘should,’  to  do  this  missing  work.  Must  we 
think  that  there  is  one  unambiguous  subjective  ‘should’  that  plays  these  roles 
perfectly?  Certainly  not.  Perhaps  some  degree  of  sacriﬁce  with  respect  to  at 
least  one  of  these  desiderata  is  necessary.  If  so,  we  might  end  up  with  a  choice 
about  where  and  how  much  sacriﬁce  to  permit.  We  could  privilege  the 
character  role  and  end  up  with  one  ‘should,’  we  could  privilege  the 
followability  role  and  end  up  with  another  ‘should,’  or  we  could  do  something 
else.  On  this  picture,  we  could  end  up  with  two,  three,  or  even  inﬁnitely  many 
diﬀerent  subjective  ‘shoulds’  corresponding  to  diﬀerent  ways  of  weighing 
these  desiderata.  But  while  we  will  not  take  a  stand  on  many  subjective 
‘shoulds’  there  are,  we  will  at  least  assume  this:  If  a  given  norm  fares strictly 
worse ,  with  respect  to  these  desiderata,  than  some  rival  norm,  then,  absent 
some  other  role  for  the  norm  in  question  to  play,  the  norm  isn’t  one  that 
deserves  a  place  in  our  (subjective)  moral  theorizing. 
In  what  follows,  we’ll  consider  various  norms  that  might  be  thought  to 
apply  to  someone  like  Frances  in  order  to  investigate  how  eﬀectively  these 
diﬀerent  norms  can  play  the  roles  we  have  identiﬁed.  We  will  concentrate  on 
one  popular  norm,  which  would  require  Frances  to  tell  the  truth.  But  as  we  will 
see,  the  norm  is  outperformed  by  a  diﬀerent  norm,  which  would  require 
Frances  to  tell  the  lie. 
 
 
8 Perhaps  there’s  a  third  role  we’ve  neglected,  which  is  to delineate  those  acts  for  which  a  person 
cannot  aptly  be  blamed  or  criticized .  This  is  certainly  an  important  role,  but  I  think  it’s  a  mistake  to 
construe  this  role  as  being  entirely  independent  from  those  already  outlined.  We  will  confront  this 
issue  at  the  end  of  the  paper.  For  discussion  of  blame  in  the  face  of  moral  ignorance,  see  Arpaly  and 
Schroeder  (1999,  2014),  Arpaly  (2002,  2003,  2015),  Driver  (2001),  Markovits  (2010),  Zimmerman 
(2010),  and  Shoemaker  (2011). 
9 Presumably,  there  are  some  situations  where  good  people  would  act  in  diﬀerent  ways.  In 
such  cases,  multiple  options  might  be  permissible.  What  we’re  looking  for  is  a  norm  that  tracks 
what  any  good  person  would  do. 
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3 Three  Norms:  Opaque,  Transparent,  Translucent 
What  type  of  norm  might  apply  to  an  agent  like  Frances?  We’ll  consider  a  few 
possibilities.  To  get  a  feel  for  what  these  diﬀerent  norms  look  like,  we’ll  think 
about  how  their  respective  contents  vary  (or  don’t  vary)  depending  upon  which 
moral  theory  is  correct.  For  illustration,  we’ll  focus  on  two  moral  theories: 
Utilitarianism  (which  requires  us  to  maximize  utility)  and  a  rights-based  view 
(which  requires  us  not  to  violate  people’s  rights).  Before  we  examine  the  three 
types  of  norms  which  are,  in  eﬀect,  candidates  for  a  subjective  ‘should,’  it  is 
worth  ﬁrst  considering  the  objective  norm,  for  contrast. 
True  Moral  Theory Objective  Norm 
Utilitarianism “Do  whatever,  in  fact,  maximizes  utility.” 
Rights-based  View “Do  not,  in  fact,  violate  anyone’s  rights.” 
The  objective  norm  does  not  depend  on  an  agent’s  evidence  at  all.  It  would 
require  our  doctor  to  withhold  medicine  from  her  ailing  patient.  As  we’ve  seen, 
this  norm  does  not  play  either  of  our  two  roles  eﬀectively.  It  does  not  track  what 
a  good  person  would  do,  nor  is  it  remotely  followable.  We  can  do  be er. 
The  objective  norm  can  be  contrasted  with  various  subjective  norms,  all  of 
which  do  depend  on  an  agent’s  evidence  in  some  way.  We’ll  start  with  what  can 
be  called  the opaque  norm .  Though  the  opaque  norm  does  depend  on  an  agent’s 
evidence,  it  does  not  depend  on  her  evidence about  which  moral  theory  is  correct .  In 
this  way,  it  is  subjective  but  also  ‘anchored’  to  the  correct  moral  theory. 
True  Moral  Theory Opaque  Norm 
Utilitarianism “Maximize  expected  utility.” 
Rights-based  view “Minimize  the  likelihood  that  you  violate  someone’s  rights.” 
Unlike  the  objective  norm,  the  opaque  norm  requires  our  doctor  to  give  the 
medicine  to  her  patient.  At  the  same  time,  the  opaque  norm  would  require 
Frances  to  tell  the  lie  (at  least,  given  any  plausible  moral  theory). 
Though  the  opaque  norm  may  capture  something  important,  it  arguably 
leaves  something  to  be  desired  on  the  followability  front.  One  might  complain: 
“Gee,  the  opaque  norm  is  great  for  those  who  have  solved  ethics—but  not  so 
helpful  to  the  rest  of  us!”  This  is  why  we’ve  labeled  it  the  ‘opaque’ 
norm—someone  who  isn’t  sure  which  moral  theory  is  correct  (i.e.  virtually 
everyone)  won’t  be  sure  what  the  opaque  norm  requires  and  therefore  won’t  be 
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in  a  position  to  use  it.  In  response,  we  might  look  for  a  diﬀerent  norm,  one  which 
can  be  useful  even  in  the  absence  of  moral  omniscience.  
The  simplest  norm  of  this  type  can  be  called  the transparent norm,  which 
requires  a  person  to do  whatever  she  believes  is  right —regardless  of  which  moral 
theory  is  true.  10
True  Moral  Theory Transparent  Norm 
Utilitarianism “Do  whatever  you  believe  is  right.” 
Rights-based  view “Do  whatever  you  believe  is  right.” 
Now  here’s  a  very  followable  norm.  Notably,  you  don’t  need  to  solve  ethics  to 
determine  what  the  norm  recommends;  you  only  need  to  be  aware  of  your  own 
moral  beliefs.  But  while  conforming  to  this  norm  may  not  be  especially  diﬃcult, 
it  isn’t  clear  that  this  norm  represents  an  ideal  worth  aiming  at.  As  Elizabeth 
Harman  points  out,  people  who  do  reprehensible  things  might  well  believe  those 
things  to  be  right,  but  this  doesn’t  seem  to  excuse  their  behavior  (2011,  pp. 
457–458,  2015,  p.  65).  Andrew  Sepielli,  writing  from  the  other  side  of  the  debate, 
agrees  with  Harman  on  this  point  and  suggests  a  possible  path  forward.  
It  would  be  absurd  to  let  a  Nazi  oﬀ  the  hook  for  heinous  acts  just  because  he  was 
very  conﬁdent  in  the  moral  view  upon  which  he  based  those  acts  (Harman  2011, 
2015).  What  seems  more  relevant  is  how  reasonable  or  well-grounded  that 
conﬁdence  is.  (2018,  p.  6) 
Accordingly,  some,  including  Sepielli,  have  proposed  norms  which  are  similar  to 
the  transparent  norm—but  modiﬁed  to  include  a  ‘reasonableness’  or  ‘rationality’ 
condition,  which  serves  to  exclude  actors  like  the  imagined  Nazi. 
In  the  spirit  of  Sepielli’s  suggestion,  here  is  what  we’ll  call  the translucent 
norm ,  which  requires  us  to  do  whatever  it  is  rational  for  one  to  believe  is  right .  11
10 Ewing  (1953)  who  may  have  introduced  the  notion  of  the  subjective  ‘should,’  seemed  to 
have  this  norm  in  mind.  Gracely  (1996)  and  Gustaﬀson  &  Torpman  (2014)  propose  a  related  norm: 
Do  whatever  is  recommended  by  the  moral  theory  of  which  you  are  most  conﬁdent.  Schroeder 
(2009)  defends  an  account  of  the  subjective  ‘should’  with  the  following  consequence:  If  a  person 
believes  that,  objectively,  she  should  ф ,  then  subjectively,  she  should  ф .  See  also  Schroeder  (2017). 
11 For  ease  of  presentation,  we  have  construed  the  translucent  norm  as  simply  as  possible,  but 
it  is  critical  to  note  that  a  variety  of  more  sophisticated  norms  have  been  proposed,  which  are 
similar  to  the  translucent  norm  in  spirit.  Way  and  Whiting  (2016a)  come  the  closest  to  defending 
the  translucent  norm  as  stated.  They  argue  that  a  person  should ф  if  she  justiﬁably  believes  she 
should ф .  Kiesewe er  (2016)  defends  a  related  view.  A  diﬀerent  approach,  favored  by  Lockhart 
(2000),  Ross  (2006),  Sepielli  (2009,  2018),  and  Enoch  (2014),  requires  a  person  to maximize  expected 
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True  Moral  Theory Translucent  Norm 
Utilitarianism “Do  whatever  it  is  rational  for  one  to  believe  is  right.” 
Rights-based  view “Do  whatever  it  is  rational  for  one  to  believe  is  right.” 
We’ve  labeled  this  norm  “translucent”  because  it  seems  to  occupy  a  kind  of 
middle  ground,  with  respect  to  followability,  between  the  transparent  and 
opaque  norms.  On  the  one  hand,  the  translucent  norm  seems  less  followable  than 
the  transparent  norm:  While  the  transparent  norm’s  prescriptions  are  simply  a 
function  of  the  agent’s  own  moral  beliefs,  the  translucent  norm’s  prescriptions 
are  a  function  of  the  moral  beliefs  it  would  be  rational  for  the  agent  to  have.  On 
the  other  hand,  the  translucent  norm  seems  more  followable  than  the  opaque 
norm:  Determining  what  the  opaque  norm  requires  will  involve  solving 
ethics—a  tall  order,  to  say  the  least.  But  determining  what  the  translucent  norm 
requires  will  only  involve  rationally  assessing  one’s  own  evidence  about  ethics. 
So  it  may  seem  that  the  translucent  norm  strikes  an  ideal  balance  between 
unpalatable  extremes.  The  transparent  norm  makes  compliance  easy  but 
worthless,  since  even  the  Nazi  can  conform  to  it.  The  opaque  norm  makes 
compliance  valuable  but  exceedingly  diﬃcult  to  a ain,  since  it  is  anchored  to  the 
correct  moral  theory.  The  translucent  norm  appears  to  be  the  Goldilocks 
approach.  But  this  appearance  is  misleading.  In  what  follows,  we’ll  assess  how 
eﬀectively  the  translucent  and  opaque  norms  play  the  roles  outlined  earlier.  First, 
we’ll  examine  some  grounds  for  thinking  that  the  opaque  norm  enjoys  an 
advantage  with  respect  to  the  character  role.  Next,  we’ll  turn  to  the  issue  of 
followability.  Intuitively,  you  might  expect  that  the  translucent  norm  will  enjoy 
an  advantage  over  the  opaque  norm  here.  But  as  it  turns  out,  this  tempting 
thought  proves  diﬃcult  to  justify. 
 
 
objective  moral  value .  As  Hedden  (2016)  observes,  this  approach  has  the  virtue  of  being  sensitive  to 
the  epistemic  probabilities  of  the  various  moral  theories  as  well  as  the  stakes  each  theory  would 
assign  to  the  agent’s  decision.  In  our  central  example,  the  view  would  only  recommend  that 
Frances  tell  the  truth  if  her  rational  conﬁdence  in  the  no-lying  principle  were  high  enough  to  oﬀset 
the  potential  moral  disaster,  in  the  event  that  lying  is  permissible.  All  of  the  arguments  in  this 
paper  that  concern  the  translucent  norm  will  apply  equally  to  this  view,  too.  See  Hedden  (2016), 
Kieswe er  (2016),  Podgorski  (2020),  or  Johnson  King  (forthcoming)  for  further  discussion. 
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4 Character  and  the  Virtues 
4.1 Judgments  about  Cases 
In  cases  when  the  two  norms  conﬂict,  would  a  good  person  conform  to  the 
opaque  norm  or  the  translucent  one?  One  reason  for  thinking  that  the  opaque 
norm  be er  tracks  what  a  good  person  would  do  derives  from  intuitive 
judgments  about  cases,  such  as  Frances’s  Dilemma.  If  Frances  really  is  a  good 
person,  the  thought  goes,  surely  she’ll  care  more  about  protecting  her  friend’s  life 
than  she’ll  care  about  “doing  the  right  thing,”  and  so  she’ll  tell  the  lie  (as  the 
opaque  norm  requires).  The  translucent  norm,  in  contrast,  requires  Frances  to  tell 
the  truth,  which  seems  like  the  wrong  result.  Other  examples,  such  as  the  case  of 
Huckleberry  Finn,  can  be  used  to  similar  eﬀect.  If  the  judgments  these  cases  12
elicit  are  to  be  trusted,  it  follows  that  a  good  person  will  at  least  sometimes  act 
against  her  moral  convictions  (thereby  violating  the  translucent  norm  and  its  ilk). 
But  some  have  expressed  skepticism  about  whether  these  cases  can  do  the 
relevant  sort  of  work,  despite  the  intuitions  they  elicit.  For  this  reason,  it  is  13
worth  exploring  approaches  to  this  question  that  do  not  rely  so  heavily  on 
intuitions  about  the  very  sorts  of  cases  at  issue.  As  it  happens,  an  alternative 
approach  is  available—one  that  involves  thinking  about  how  speciﬁc  character 
virtues  are  applied  in  the  face  of  moral  ignorance.  Even  without  relying  centrally 
on  contested  intuitions,  it  can  be  argued  the  translucent  norm  does  not  track 
what  a  virtuous  person  would  do  as  faithfully  as  the  opaque  norm  does. 
 
4.2   Argument  from  the  Virtues 
We  can  start  with  an  innocuous  observation:  Good  people  tend  to  have  certain 
traits  (kindness,  fairness,  generosity,  courage,  etc.).  Though  this  seems  a  truism, 
it  turns  out  to  provide  some  useful  leverage.  For  we  can  explore  how  these  more 
speciﬁc  traits  interact  with  one’s  (rationally  held)  beliefs  about  what’s  right. 
Consider  the  following  case. 
12 Arpaly  and  Schroeder  (1999,  2014),  Arpaly  (2002,  2003,  2015),  Harman  (2011,  2015), 
Weatherson  (2015).  Relatedly,  Smith  (1994)  takes  it  as  a  premise  that  being  motivated  to  do  as  one 
deems  ‘right’  constitutes  a  vicious  ‘moral  fetishism.’  But  some  have  disputed  this  proposition  (see 
Sepielli  2016).  Below,  we’ll  explore  what  follows  for  the  present  debate  even  if  we  allow,  contra 
Smith,  that  a  concern  for  what’s  right  may  constitute  a  virtue  rather  than  a  vice. 
13 See  Zimmerman  (2010,  p.  201),  Kiesewe er  (2016,  p.  767),  or  Johnson  King  (2020,  p.  188). 
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Public  Speaking : Allie  has  been  invited  to  speak  in  front  of  a  large  audience  about  a 
painful  and  deeply  personal  subject.  The  prospect  terriﬁes  her;  she  has  never  spoken 
in  front  of  such  a  large  group  before.  In  addition,  Allie  happens  to  have  a  false 
moral  belief:  She  believes—rationally,  we  can  suppose—that  sharing  personal 
stories  such  as  hers  with  large  audiences  is  morally  wrong  because  it  is  immodest  to 
do  so.  As  a  result,  she  believes  that  it  would  be  wrong  to  share  her  story  publicly.  At 
the  same  time,  she  knows  that  sharing  her  story  could  be  of  great  service  to  others 
who  are  struggling  with  issues  similar  to  those  she  faced.  For  this  reason,  she 
decides  to  accept  the  invitation,  despite  her  reservations. 
Some  might  react  to  this  case  by  asserting,  ﬂat  out,  that  Allie’s  decision  reﬂects 
well  on  her  character.  I  ﬁnd  this  verdict  intuitive  also.  But  in  the  present  context, 
this  appeal  to  intuition  does  not  add  much  to  the  examples  cited  previously.  A 
proponent  of  the  translucent  norm  could  say,  in  response,  that  if  Allie  were 
really  a  good  person,  she  would  care  deeply  about  doing  the  right  thing  and 
would,  hence,  not  share  her  story  if  she  truly  believed  it  were  wrong  to  do  so. 
Even  if  it  is  controversial  whether  Allie’s  decision  reﬂects  well  on  her 
character  overall,  there  is  another  judgment  that  is,  I  think,  more  secure:  Allie’s 
decision  reﬂects  well  on  her  in  at  least  one  respect—it  was courageous .  If  this  is  so, 
it  follows  that  at  least  one  virtue,  courage,  does  not  require  one  to  do  what  one 
rationally  believes  is  right.  After  all,  Allie  clearly  acts  courageously  despite  doing 
something  she  rationally  believes  to  be  wrong. 
Is  this  feature  unique  to  courage?  Or  do  other  character  virtues  share  this 
insensitivity  to  one’s  rationally  held  beliefs  about  what’s  right?  It  seems  to  me 
that  other  virtues  do  share  this  feature.  Take  generosity,  for  instance.  Suppose 
Scrooge  rationally  believes  that  giving  to  homeless  people  is  wrong  because  such 
people  “are  there  by  their  own  fault  and  deserve  to  suﬀer  the  consequences.” 
Despite  his  mistaken  belief,  Scrooge  acts  generously  when  he  invites  a  person 
who  is  homeless  to  sleep  in  his  apartment  on  a  cold  night.  As  is  true  with 
courage,  one  can  be  generous  even  as  one  acts  against  one’s  rationally  held  moral 
beliefs.  For  many  other  virtues,  the  same  pa ern  seems  to  hold. 
These  observations  give  rise  to  a  question.  If  individual  virtues  like  courage, 
generosity,  etc.  do  not  require  that  one  does  what  one  deems  right,  why  should 
the  property  of being  virtuous —which  presumably  involves  having  these  more 
speciﬁc—work  any  diﬀerently?  Why  not  think  it,  too,  a aches  directly  to  a 
certain  sort  of  conduct—quite  apart  from  whatever  moral  principles  an  agent 
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happens  to  believe?  And,  of  course,  if  one  can  be  virtuous  without  acting  in 
accordance  with  one’s  moral  beliefs  (rational  or  otherwise),  then  the  translucent 
norm  is  not  going  to  track  what  a  good  person  would  do—at  least,  it  won’t  do  so 
perfectly,  and  it  presumably  won’t  do  so  as  faithfully  as  the  opaque  norm  would. 
In  response  to  this  challenge,  a  proponent  of  the  translucent  norm  might 
argue  that being  disposed  to  do  what  one  deems  right  is  a  virtue  of  its  own.  They 
might  say: 
True,  most  virtues  do  seem  to  allow  or  even  require  a  person  to  act  against  what  she 
believes  to  be  right.  But  there’s  a  virtue  you  didn’t  emphasize, conscientiousness , 
which  is  all  about  doing  what  one  believes  to  be  right.  Part  of  being  a  good  person  is 
having  this  virtue.  14
The  suggestion  being  made  above  is  a  controversial  one:  What  some  would  see 
as  a  virtue  of  conscientiousness,  others  would  see  as  a  vicious  (or  at  least  neutral) 
“moral  fetishism.”  So  traditionally,  there  is  something  of  an  impasse  here.  But  15
for  present  purposes,  I  think  we  can  make  progress  even  if  we  grant  that 
conscientiousness  is  a  virtue.  That  is,  I  think  we  can  reply  to  the  objection  posed 
above  on  its  own  terms. 
For  even  if  we  grant  that  conscientiousness  is  a  virtue,  it  doesn’t  follow  that 
the  perfectly  virtuous  person  will  always  conform  to  the  translucent  norm.  There 
are  still  other  virtues  (courage,  generosity,  etc.),  with  which  conscientiousness 
can  clash.  When  such  a  clash  happens,  a  good  person  will  be  conﬂicted:  Her 
conscientiousness  will  incline  her  to  do  what  she  deems  ‘right,’  but  other  virtues 
will  incline  her  to  do  the  opposite.  It’s  natural  to  think  that  these  conﬂicts  will  be 
resolved  in  diﬀerent  ways,  depending  upon  the  speciﬁcs  of  each  case.  But  the 
defender  of  the  translucent  norm  cannot  allow  this.  To  obtain  the  result  that  the 
translucent  norm perfectly,  in  all  cases  tracks  what  a  good  person  would  do,  it  has 
to  be  the  case  that  conscientiousness  always  wins  these  conﬂicts.  Is  this 
plausible?  In  defense  of  the  idea,  a  proponent  of  the  translucent  norm  might  take 
either  of  two  approaches—one  which  is  very  bold,  and  one  which  is  more 
modest. 
14 Hurka  (2014,  pp.  498–499)  argues  that  it  is  a  virtue  to  be  (defeasibly)  disposed  to  follow 
one’s  conscience,  where  ‘following  one’s  conscience’  involves  acting  as  one  believes  right.  Johnson 
King  (forthcoming)  pursues  a  similar  line.  See  Arpaly  (2015,  pp.  147–151)  for  a  reply  to  Hurka.  
15 Smith  (1994,  Ch.  3,  §5). 
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First,  she  might  take  a  bold  stance,  asserting  simply  that conscientiousness  is 
the  only  virtue —contrary  to  what  we  have  been  assuming.  On  this  sort  of  view,  it 
just  isn’t  true  that  a  good  person  would  be  kind,  generous,  courageous,  and  so 
on.  Fundamentally,  a  good  person  would  be  motivated  to  do  what’s  right,  but 
not,  say,  to  treat  people  well.  This  hard  line  view  is  coherent,  but  I  suspect  that 
few  would  be  prepared  to  go  this  far.  16
Alternatively,  the  translucent  norm  advocate  might  opt  for  what  would 
seem  a  more  modest  view.  She  might  say  that  while  kindness,  generosity, 
courage  and  the  like  are  certainly  virtues,  conscientiousness  enjoys  a  special 
priority  over  them  enabling  it  to  win  all  inter-virtue  conﬂicts  that  may  arise.  On 
this  picture,  a  good  person  would  be  super-conscientious  (always  doing  what 
she  believed  was  right  when  applicable),  while  also  being  kind,  generous,  and  so 
on,  insofar  as  was  possible.  
In  response,  one  might  ask  what  role  these  secondary  virtues  would  be 
playing,  if  any,  on  the  foregoing  picture:  If  the  good  person  always  does  what 
she  believes  is  right,  in  what  sense  can  she  be  said  to  possess  other  virtues?  Is  she 
ever  motivated  by  kindness,  for  example?  Wouldn’t  conscientiousness  be  doing 
all  the  real  work? 
One  possible  answer  is  that  these  other  ‘secondary’  virtues,  such  as 
kindness,  shape  the  good  person’s  behavior  when  conscientiousness  is 
silent—that  is,  when  she  believes  that  there  are  multiple  permissible  options.  17
The  idea  can  be  illustrated  by  way  of  the  following  example. 
Libertarian  Samaritan : Xena  rationally  believes  in  a  libertarian  moral  view, 
according  to  which  there  are  no  positive  duties  to  provide  aid  at  all.  One  day,  she 
comes  upon  someone  in  severe  need  and  must  decide  whether  to  lend  him 
16 Rosen  (2004)  comes  the  closest  to  defending  this  view.  Rosen  is  concerned  with 
blameworthiness  rather  than  character.  He  argues  that  the  only  way  for  a  person  to  be blameworthy 
is  by  acting  against  her  own  moral  beliefs.  Rosen’s  view  allows  that  a  sincere  Nazi  could  be 
blameless,  which  I  think  few  would  be  willing  to  accept.  Even  fewer  would  allow  that  sincere 
Nazis  are  good  people. 
17 Interestingly,  this  answer  actually  isn’t  available  to  those  who  defend  the  translucent 
norm’s  expectational  cousin,  which  tells  an  agent  to  maximize  expected  objective  moral  value  (see 
fn.  11).  As  Hedden  (2016)  observes,  this  norm  is  going  to  be  quite  demanding,  much  more 
demanding  than,  say,  the  translucent  norm.  Like  other  norms  that  require  the  maximization  of 
some  value,  this  norm  will  virtually  never  be  silent.  If  conscientiousness  is  deﬁned 
correspondingly,  then  it  too  will  virtually  never  be  silent,  in  which  case,  the  ‘secondary’  virtues 
would  be  almost  entirely  inert  in  shaping  the  good  person’s  behavior.  
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assistance.  Given  her  moral  commitments,  Xena  believes  that  she  is  permi ed  to 
help  him,  but  she  also  believes  she  is  permi ed  not  to.  What  should  she  do? 
If  Xena  is  a  good  person,  she  will  always  do  what  she  believes  is  right.  But  here, 
her  moral  beliefs  are  silent.  According  to  her  libertarian  ideology  (to  which  she 
rationally  subscribes),  both  options  are  permissible.  Correspondingly, 
conscientiousness  is  silent.  So  even  if  Xena  is  maximally  conscientious,  there  is 
still  space  for  other  aspects  of  her  character  to  show  themselves.  And  plausibly,  if 
she’s  kind,  she’ll  provide  the  help. 
But  there  is  an  observation  worth  making  here.  Recall  that  our  aim  in  this 
section  is  to  assess  how  well  the  translucent  and  opaque  norms  respectively  track 
what  a  good  person  would  do.  In  the  Libertarian  Samaritan  case,  all  sides  can 
agree  that  if  Xena  is  a  good  person,  she  will  oﬀer  assistance.  The  opaque  norm 
presumably  requires  her  to  do  precisely  this.  The  translucent  norm  does  not.  So  18
in  this  one  case,  the  opaque  norm  more  faithfully  tracks  what  a  good  person 
would  do  than  its  rival. 
Unless  the  defender  of  the  translucent  norm  is  to  argue  boldly  that 
conscientiousness  is  the  only  virtue  (which  hardly  involves  remaining  neutral 
with  respect  to  ﬁrst-order  ethical  questions),  it  should  be  acknowledged  that  the 
translucent  norm  does  not  perfectly  track  what  a  person  of  good  character  would 
do,  and  that  the  opaque  norm  seems  to  fare  be er  on  this  score.  Sometimes,  a 
good  person  will  be  motivated  by  something  other  than  her  moral  convictions.  
 
5 Followability 
Even  if  the  conclusion  of  the  previous  section  is  correct,  it  doesn’t  follow  that  the 
translucent  norm  deserves  no  place  in  our  moral  theorizing.  We  outlined  two 
important  roles  earlier—character  and  followability—and  it  may  be  that  no  norm 
can  play  both  roles  perfectly.  Though  the  translucent  norm  may  not  track  what  a 
person  of  good  character  would  do  as  faithfully  as  the  opaque  norm  does,  the 
translucent  norm  seems  followable  in  a  way  that  the  opaque  norm  isn’t. 
18 Assume,  for  the  sake  of  argument,  that  Xena’s  beliefs  are  not  correct—or  in  other  words, 
that  this  is  a  case  of  rational  moral  ignorance.  Given  this  assumption,  only  the  opaque  norm  will 
require  Xena  to  provide  the  assistance. 
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5.1  Se ing  the  Stage 
I  want  to  start  by  drawing  out  the intuition  that  the  translucent  norm  is  more 
followable  than  the  opaque  one.  The  content  of  the  opaque  norm  depends 
heavily  upon  which  moral  theory  happens  to  be  correct.  If  utilitarianism  is  true, 
the  norm  will  require  us  to  maximize  expected  utility;  if  a  rights-based  view  is 
true,  the  norm  will  instead  require  us  to  minimize  the  chance  of  commi ing  a 
rights  violation.  And  of  course,  ethics  is  hard .  It’s  hard  to  know  which  moral 
theory  is  correct.  For  this  reason,  it’s  hard  to  know  what  the  opaque  norm 
requires.  In  contrast,  we  seem  to  know  precisely  what  the  translucent  norm 
requires.  It  requires  us  to do  whatever  it  is  rational  to  believe  is  right .  Admi edly,  it 
may  not  be  easy  to  conform  to  this  norm.  Evaluating  the  evidence  in  a  rational 
manner  can  be  diﬃcult.  But  still,  the  translucent  norm  still  seems  to  be  helpful  in 
a  way  that  the  opaque  norm  isn’t.  When  someone  tells  me  to  conform  to  the 
opaque  norm,  it’s  as  if  they’re  telling  me  “Solve  ethics!”  But  when  someone  tells 
me  to  conform  to  the  translucent  norm,  it’s  as  if  they’re  telling  me  “Follow  your 
evidence.”  The  la er  seems  a  much  more  reasonable  request. 
There  are  a  few  simple  ways  one  might  try  to  capture  this  intuition.  First,  it 
might  be  suggested  that  we  can  explicitly  state  the  content  of  the  translucent 
norm  but  not  the  opaque  norm.  But  this  assessment  oversimpliﬁes  the  situation. 
In  what  sense  can  we  specify  exactly  what  the  translucent  norm  requires?  If  we’re 
unsure  about  what  it’s  rational  to  believe  in  a  particular  case,  then  at  best,  we’ll 
be  able  to  express  the  translucent  norm’s  prescriptions  as  a  conjunction  of 
conditional  norms. 
If  it’s  rational  to  believe  that X  is  right,  do X ;  if  it’s  rational  to  believe  that Y  is  right, 
do  Y ;  etc. 
Viewed  this  way,  it  is  evident  that  we  cannot  specify  explicitly  what  the 
translucent  norm  requires.  And  moreover,  it  must  be  acknowledged  that  the 
opaque  norm  can  be  characterized  in  a  similar  fashion. 
If  utilitarianism  is  true,  maximize  expected  utility;  if  a  rights-based  view  is  true, 
minimize  the  likelihood  of  commi ing  a  rights  violation;  etc.  19
19 A  proponent  of  the  opaque  norm  might  resist  this  construal.  After  all,  if  utilitarianism  is 
true,  then  the  opaque  norm  requires  us  simply  to maximize  expected  utility .  If  anything,  this 
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There  is  a  structural  parallel  here.  We  will  have  to  work  a  bit  harder  to  identify  a 
relevant  asymmetry. 
A  second  approach  can  be  motivated  as  follows.  
To  assess  how  followable  a  norm  is,  just  ask: What’s  the  chance  I’d  succeed  in 
conforming  to  the  norm  if  I  tried?  Successfully  conforming  to  the  opaque  norm 
involves  either  solving  ethics  (unlikely)  or  simply  guessing  which  moral  theory  is 
correct  (also  unlikely).  But  successfully  conforming  to  the  translucent  norm  just 
involves  evaluating  my  evidence  rationally  (relatively  likely)  and  then  doing  what  I 
believe  is  right. 
This  is  a  natural  observation.  If  an  agent  were  to  try  to  conform  to  both  norms  in 
turn,  her  success  rate  for  the  translucent  norm  might  well  be  greater.  But  what 
follows  from  this  kind  of  followability  advantage?  
Consider  the  following  norm:  “When  you  roll  two  dice,  whatever  you  do, 
please  make  sure  they  don’t  land  double  sixes!”  The  probability  of  conformity 
with  this  norm  is  high,  but  it  is  clearly  unfollowable  in  an  important  sense:  It 
wouldn’t  be  fair  to  expect  someone  to  conform  to  this  norm.  Earlier,  when  we 
invoked  followability,  the  motivating  thought  was  that,  if  a  norm  is  followable,  it 
had  be er  be  fair  to  expect  someone  to  conform  to  its  prescriptions.  (Recall  that 
this  is  what  the  objective  norm  was  lacking.)  So  it’s  not  enough  to  show  that,  say, 
the  probability  of  conformity  with  the  translucent  norm  is  higher.  What  is 
needed  is  not  a  diﬀerence  in  degree,  but  a  diﬀerence  in  kind:  To  show  that  the 
translucent  norm  enjoys  a  relevant  advantage  over  its  rival,  we  have  to  show  that 
it  meets  some  important  standard  of  fairness  that  the  opaque  norm  fails  to  meet.  
5.2  Trackability 
What  sort  of  standard  would  achieve  the  above  goal?  Returning  to  the  objective 
norm  is  a  good  ﬁrst  step.  For  we  already  know  that  the  objective  norm  seems 
egregiously  unfollowable  in  just  about  every  relevant  sense.  Intuitively,  it  isn’t  at 
all  fair  or  reasonable  to  expect  someone  to  conform  to  it.  But  why  not? 
Here’s  an  idea.  Why  is  the  objective  norm  unfollowable?  Because  no  one  on 
Earth  (or  anywhere  else)  could  consistently  and  reliably  conform  to  it!  This  20
observation  makes  the  opaque  norm  seem  somewhat  more  followable.  To  make  things  as  diﬃcult 
on  ourselves  possible,  we  will  set  this  point  aside. 
20 Here,  it  is  advisable  to  distinguish conforming  to  a  norm ,  on  the  one  hand,  from using  a  norm 
to  guide  one’s  decision-making ,  on  the  other.  Whether  one  conforms  is  a  purely  extensional  ma er; 
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thought  can  be  captured  by  appeal  to  a  standard  which  might  be  called 
trackability . 
Trackability :  A  norm  is trackable  if  and  only  if  there  could  be  a  person  who,  given 
her  psychological  makeup,  is  certain  to  succeed  in  conforming  to  it.  
To  illustrate,  it  will  help  to  think  about  a  toy  norm  that  fails  to  meet  this 
standard.  Suppose  a  schoolteacher  has  the  following  unfair  classroom  rule:  To 
pass  her  class,  students  must  correctly  predict  the  result  of  a  fair  coin  ﬂip.  Of 
course,  in  any  individual  case,  or  in  any  series  of  cases,  a  given  student  can  get 
lucky.  But  there’s  no  strategy  that  is  certain  to  succeed.  For  this  reason,  the 
teacher’s  rule  is  not  trackable. 
For  similar  reasons,  the  objective  norm  is  not  trackable  either.  After  all,  it 
requires  us  to  choose  whichever  option  will,  in  fact,  produce  the  morally  best 
outcome.  In  any  given  case,  this  may  involve  predicting  which  way  a  coin  will 
land  or  guessing  on  the  basis  of  insuﬃcient  evidence  whether  a  patient  is  allergic 
to  some  medicine.  Since  there  is  no  strategy  certain  to  succeed  at  such  tasks,  the 
objective  norm,  like  the  classroom  rule,  is  untrackable. 
What  about  the  translucent  and  opaque  norms?  Are  they  trackable?  It  seems 
clear  that  both  of  them  are.  Take  the  translucent  norm  ﬁrst.  To  show  this  norm  to 
be  trackable,  we  must  engineer  a  being  that  would  always  conform  to  it.  Imagine 
that  Lucy  is  epistemically  rational—she  always  believes  what  her  evidence 
supports.  Furthermore,  let’s  add  that  Lucy’s  sole  goal  in  life  is,  in  her  own  words, 
“to  do  the  right  thing,  whatever  that  happens  to  be.”  For  this  reason,  Lucy 
always  does  what  she  believes  is  right.  Given  Lucy’s  rationality  and  her 
approach  to  decision-making,  it  is  clear  that  she  will  conform  to  the  translucent 
norm  in  all  possible  situations.  So  the  translucent  norm  is  trackable. 
Let’s  try  the  opaque  norm  next.  Here,  things  are  a  bit  more  complicated, 
since  the  content  of  the  opaque  norm  depends  upon  which  moral  theory  is 
correct.  In  principle,  these  contents  might  diﬀer  with  respect  to  trackability.  But 
in  practice,  I  think,  the  opaque  norm  will  turn  out  to  be  trackable  for  most,  if  not 
whether  one  is  suitably  guided  depends  upon  the  details  of  her  deliberative  activity.  See  Smith 
(2012,  2018),  Way  and  Whiting  (2016b),  and  Hughes  (2018)  for  helpful  discussion  of  this  la er 
notion.  The  ﬁrst  standard  we’ll  examine  is  conformity-centered;  the  ones  we’ll  examine  thereafter 
are  guidance-centered. 
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all,  moral  theories.  For  illustration,  let’s  ﬁx,  by  stipulation,  a  correct  moral  theory. 
Speciﬁcally,  let’s  stipulate  that  morality  consists  in  equal  parts  promotion  of 
welfare  and  respect  for  autonomy.  With  this  provision  in  place,  we  can  formulate 
the  opaque  norm  explicitly: Do  what  you  expect  will  promote  welfare  and  respect 
autonomy .  Can  we  engineer  someone  who  is  psychologically  certain  to  conform 
to  this  norm?  It  seems  clear  that  we  can.  Imagine  that  Opal  (like  Lucy)  is 
epistemically  rational—she  always  believes  what  her  evidence  supports.  21
Furthermore,  let’s  add  that  Opal’s  sole  goal  in  life  is,  in  her  own  words,  “to  do 
whatever  promotes  welfare  and  respects  autonomy—whether  it’s  right  or  not!” 
Opal  may  not  know  it  or  even  care,  but  she  will  conform  to  the  opaque  norm  in 
all  possible  situations.  So  the  opaque  norm  is  trackable  too. 
Thus,  trackability  cannot  ground  an  asymmetry  between  the  translucent  and 
opaque  norms.  Both  norms  meet  this  standard.  But  trackability,  as  a  standard  of 
followability,  arguably  leaves  something  to  be  desired.  It  is  quite  weak,  as  the 
following  exchange  illustrates. 
You : I’m  in  a  bit  of  a  pickle.  I’m  not  sure  which  moral  theory  is  correct.  What 
should  I  do? 
Oracle : Hmm.  Here’s  some  advice:  Conform  to  the  opaque  norm . 
You : That’s  entirely  unhelpful.  I  don’t  know  what  the  opaque  norm  says!  How 
can  you  expect  me  to  conform  without  knowing  this? 
Oracle : You  doubt  the  norm  I’ve  given  you?  Unlike  the  objective  norm,  the  opaque 
norm  is  trackable.  Some  beings  conform  perfectly,  in  all  possible  situations. 
You : ... 
It’s  easy  to  sympathize  with  a  desire  for  more  guidance.  And,  admi edly,  the 
translucent  norm  does  seem  to  provide  it.  The  translucent  norm,  it  seems,  just 
has  to  be  followable  in  a  more  robust  sense.  Can  we  ﬁnd  it? 
5.3  Rational  Executability 
Before  we  examine  what  seems  to  me  the  most  promising  approach,  we  must 
ﬁrst  look  at  a  very  strong  standard,  which  we  can  call  perfect  executability . 
Perfect   Executability :  A  norm  is perfectly  executable  if  and  only  if  a  person  is  certain 
21 It’s  not  obvious  whether  this  provision  is  needed.  Interestingly,  Parﬁt  (2011,  ch.  5),  in  a 
discussion  of  practical  rationality,  suggests  that  an  epistemic  condition  should  be  applied  to  an 
agent’s  normative  beliefs,  but  not  to  her  non-normative  ones.  See  Mueller  (2017)  for  relevant 
discussion. 
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to  succeed  in  conforming  to  it  by  ‘trying’  (that  is,  by  doing  what  she  believes  is 
required  of  her).  22
This  standard  is  too  strong.  Both  norms  fall  far  short.  There  is  no  guarantee  that  a 
person  will  succeed  in  conforming  to  the  translucent  norm  if  she  tries,  for  she 
might  make  an  epistemic  mistake.  And  there’s  certainly  no  sureﬁre  way  to 
conform  to  the  opaque  norm  either.  So  the  standard  of  perfect  executability 
cannot  be  our  dividing  wedge.   But  perhaps  it  will  lead  us  to  one.  23
There  seems  to  be  something  special  about  the  translucent  norm.  Suppose 
that  I  am  an  unabashed  “moral  fetishist”:  I  am  resolutely  disposed  to  do  what  I 
believe  is  right.  Then,  so  long  as  I  reason  well  (that  is,  so  long  as  my  beliefs  about 
what’s  right  are  rational),  I’m  guaranteed  to  succeed  in  conforming  to  the 
translucent  norm.  And  this  is  signiﬁcant.  After  all,  reasoning  well  is  something 
that  it  seems  appropriate  to  expect  from  people,  whether  they  succeed  or  not.  
This  insight  allows  us  to  describe  the  standard  of  followability  that  will 
ﬁnally  drive  a  wedge  between  our  two  norms. 
Rational   Executability :  A  norm  is rationally  executable  if  and  only  if  the  norm  is 
perfectly  executable  for  anyone  whose  beliefs  about  what’s  required  of  her  are 
rationally  held. 
For  reasons  given  above,  the  translucent  norm  is  rationally  executable.  And  the 
opaque  norm  certainly  isn’t.  After  all,  someone  who  reasons  well  and  who  ‘tries’ 
in  the  relevant  sense  will  tell  the  truth  in  the  case  of  Frances,  while  the  opaque 
norm  recommends  telling  the  lie.  So,  we  have  found  a  standard  of  followability 
that  only  the  translucent  norm  meets,  as  the  table  below  indicates. 
 Trackability Perfect  Executability Rational  Executability 
Objective  Norm no no no 
Opaque  Norm yes no no 
Translucent  Norm yes no yes 
What  follows  from  this?  The  ﬁnding  might  be  somewhat  less  momentous 
than  it  seems.  Yes,  it  is  true  that  only  the  translucent  norm  is  rationally 
22 A  related  approach  is  to  say  that  a  norm  is  followable  just  in  case  one  is  always  in  a  position 
to  know  what  it  requires.  But  Williamson’s  (2000)  anti-luminosity  argument  indicates  that  a 
knowledge-based  standard  such  as  this  would  disqualify  virtually  any  norm. 
23 It’s  worth  noting,  here,  that  the  transparent  norm  actually  meets  (or  at  least  comes  close  to 
meeting)  this  standard.  This  reinforces  the  fact  that,  if  we  reject  the  transparent  norm  (as  authors  on 
both  sides  advocate),  we  are  all  sacriﬁcing  at  least  some  kind  of  followability  for  other  desiderata. 
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executable.  But  is  rational  executability  a  kind  of  followability worth  wanting ?  It  is 
not  clear.  Suppose  we  learned  that  instructions  for  adhering  to  a  certain  special 
norm  were  located  at  the  center  of  a  large  maze.  And  suppose  we  knew  that 
these  instructions  were  so  clearly  presented  that  anyone  who  found  them  would 
have  no  trouble  following  them  exactly.  We  might  say  that  the  special  norm  is 
maze-executable —that  is,  the  norm  is  perfectly  executable to  anyone  who  can 
traverse  the  maze .  Is  that,  in  itself,  valuable?  Does  it  follow  that  the  special  norm  is 
robustly  followable?  Naturally,  it  depends:  How  diﬃcult  is  the  maze? 
The  situation  with  rational  executability  is  similar.  The  translucent  norm  is 
followable  by  anyone  who  believes  rationally  about  certain  subjects.  But  how 
diﬃcult  is  it  to  be  a  rational  believer?  If  it’s  quite  diﬃcult,  then  the  translucent 
norm,  in  eﬀect,  inherits  that  diﬃculty.  Here’s  the  bo om  line:  Rational 
executability  is  a  kind  of  followability  worth  wanting  only  to  the  extent  that 
rational  norms  are  themselves  followable  in  a  deep  and  interesting  sense.  Are 
they? 
 
5.4  How  Followable  Are  Rational  Norms? 
The  preceding  question  is,  of  course,  not  easily  se led.  Its  answer  will  depend 
upon  controversial  issues  within  epistemology—including,  for  one,  the 
internalism/externalism  debate.  But  as  we  have  just  developed  some  standards 
for  assessing  the  followability  of  any  given  norm,  it  seems  appropriate  to 
proceed  by  assessing  the  followability  of  rational  norms  using  these  very 
standards—  while  staying  as  neutral  as  we  can  with  respect  to  nearby 
epistemological  debates. 
To  vindicate  the  translucent  norm,  rational  norms  had  be er  turn  out  to  be 
more  followable  than  the  opaque  norm.  (After  all,  if  there  were  parity  here,  the 
translucent  norm  would  be,  in  eﬀect,  no  more  followable  than  its  rival.)  Do 
rational  norms  fare  be er  than  the  opaque  norm?  
Consider  perfect  executability  ﬁrst.  Clearly,  rational  norms  are  not  perfectly 
executable:  Those  who  try  to  meet  them  do  not  always  succeed.  
What  about  rational  executability?  Might  rational  norms  meet  this  weaker 
standard?  Things  get  interesting  here.  The  very  question  seems  viciously 
circular,  but  it  turns  out  to  be  coherent.  Somewhat  surprisingly,  though,  there  is 
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reason  to  doubt  that  rational  norms  meet  this  standard.  24
Before  we  can  explain  why  rational  norms  may  not  be  rationally  executable, 
we  should  clarify  the  question  even  being  asked.  Suppose  that  all  of  Emily’s 
epistemological  beliefs  (e.g.  her  beliefs  about  which  theory  of  epistemic  rationality 
is  correct)  are  rationally  held.  Further,  suppose  that  Emily  is  what  we  might  call 
an epistemic  fetishist :  Her  sole  goal  in  life  is  to  be  a  rational  believer.  For  this 
reason,  whenever  she  discovers  that  her  preferred  theory  of  rationality 
recommends  that  she  adopt  some  a itude  toward  a  certain  proposition,  she 
instantly  does  so.  Here’s  the  question  we’re  after:  By  proceeding  in  this  way, 
could  Emily  ever  run  afoul  of  epistemic  rationality?  If  rational  norms  are 
rationally  executable,  then  she  couldn’t. 
Now,  it  is  very  tempting  to  think  that  Emily,  by  her  very  nature,  would 
necessarily  be  immune  from  ever  violating  rational  norms.  After  all,  she  always 
reasons about  rationality  in  a  perfectly  rational  manner,  and  from  there,  she 
always  proceeds precisely  as  her  favored  account  of  rationality  recommends. 
How  could  this  process  be  anything  less  than  rationally  perfect?  What  else  is 
Emily  to  do?  Well,  another  thing  Emily could  do  is  to  knowingly  ﬂout  her  own 
favored  account  of  rationality,  thereby  doing  something  she  herself  thought  was 
irrational.  But  this  is  a  combination  that  makes  li le  sense  from  the  inside.  It 
seems  irrational,  if  anything  is.  
Several  authors  have  argued  along  these  very  lines.  In  diﬀerent  words,  the  25
issue  at  hand  is  whether  an  agent  can  ever  be  rationally  required  to  have  an 
epistemically akratic combination  of  a itudes:  that  is,  a  combination  of  a itudes 
such  that  one  of  the  a itudes  rationally  recommends  against  the  other  (for 
24 The  precise  formulation  of  rational  executability  is  highly  relevant  here.  Note  that  a  norm  is 
rationally  executable  when  it  is  perfectly  executable  for  an  agent  who  is  speciﬁed  to  have  rational 
beliefs about  what’s  required  of  her .  This  qualiﬁcation  is  important.  If  the  agent  were  speciﬁed  to  be  a 
fully  rational  believer,  then  rational  norms  would  trivially  meet  this  standard.  But  the  goal,  for  the 
defender  of  the  translucent  norm,  is  to  show  that  rational  norms  are  followable  in  a  robust  sense. 
To  show  that  a  norm  is  robustly  followable,  one  must  do  more  than  identify  a  standard  which  it 
trivially  meets. 
25 See  Feldman  (2005),  Kolodny  (2005),  Smithies  (2012),  and  Titelbaum  (2015).  See  Greco  (2014) 
for  a  diﬀerent  sort  of  case  against  epistemic  akrasia.  For  defenses  of  the  possibility  of  rational 
epistemic  akrasia,  see  Wedgwood  (2011),  Coates  (2012),  Elga  (2013),  Horowi   (2014),  Christensen 
(2016),  Dorst  (f2019),  and  Weatherson  (ms.)—though  these  authors  acknowledge  that  epistemic 
akrasia  may  typically  be  irrational. 
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example,  believing  p while  also  believing  that  belief  in p  is  irrational).  There 
certainly  seems  to  be  something  uncomfortable  about  an  agent’s  holding  such  a 
pair  of  a itudes.  I  feel  the  intuitive  discomfort. 
And  I  do  think  that  epistemic  akrasia  is usually  and typically irrational.  But  in 
certain  cases,  there  is  reason  to  think  that  akratic  combinations  of  a itudes 
actually  can  be  rational.  In  a  paper  discussing  these  issues,  Sophie  Horowi  
(2014)  has  argued  that  while  epistemic  akrasia  is  very  often  irrational,  it  can  be 
rational  in  peculiar  cases  that  cause  expected  rationality  and  expected  accuracy 
to  diverge,  in  a  certain  sense.  Speciﬁcally,  she  notices  that,  sometimes,  an  agent 
can  be  forced  to  choose  between  a  belief  that  is  more  likely  to  be  rational  (by  her 
own  lights)  and  a  belief  that  is  more  likely  to  be  accurate  (by  her  own  lights).  In 
such  cases,  Horowi   suggests  that  an  agent  should  aim  at  accuracy.  If  this  is 
right,  then  in  certain  circumstances,  an  agent  like  Emily,  who  only  cares  about 
rationality,  can  end  up  on  the  wrong  side. 
Horowi   describes  an  instructive  example  illustrating  this  phenomenon  (p. 
736),  which  is  inspired  by  Williamson’s  case  of  the  unmarked  clock  (2014,  p.  979). 
Christensen  (2016,  pp.  413–416)  proposes  a  diﬀerent  sort  of  case  with  a  similar 
accuracy-rationality  divergence,  but  which  appeals  to  higher-order  evidence 
rather  than  vagueness.  Both  types  of  examples  are  well  worth  examining  in 
detail;  if  the  reader  is  convinced  by  either,  it  suﬃces  for  our  purposes  here.  But  I 
want  to  propose  a  third  type  of  case  that  can  exemplify  the  rationality-accuracy 
divergence,  one  which  is  structurally  parallel  to  the  example  we  considered  at 
the  outset  of  this  paper.  In  our  central  example,  Frances,  rationally  comes  to  26
believe  a  dubious  ethical  principle.  In  the  following  example,  Emily  will 
rationally  come  to  believe  a  dubious  epistemological  principle. 
Consider  the  following  view  concerning  the  epistemology  of  mathematical 
claims. 
Proof  Chauvinism :  Rationality  isn’t  just  about  accuracy;  it’s  also  about  responding 
to  the  right  reasons.  For  mathematical  propositions,  the  right  reasons  are  proofs. 
Though  one  can  obtain  very  accurate  mathematical  beliefs  by  deferring  to  reliable 
sources,  rationally  speaking,  one  should  never  be  highly  conﬁdent  in  a 
mathematical  proposition  until  one  can  derive  an  adequate  proof. 
26 See  Feldman  (2005,  p.  96)  for  a  similar  example,  though  the  case  he  discusses  does  not 
explicitly  impose  the  critical  accuracy/rationality  divergence. 
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Though  Proof  Chauvinism  is  not  an  especially  plausible  epistemological  theory, 
in  certain  circumstances,  someone  like  Emily  might  well  be  rational  to  believe  in 
its  truth.  For  instance,  we  can  imagine  that  all  of  Emily’s  epistemology 
professors—who  are  generally  quite  reliable—unanimously  and  independently 
endorse  Proof  Chauvinism.  Upon  learning  of  this  epistemological  consensus, 
Emily  could  well  be  rational  in  coming  to  believe  that  Proof  Chauvinism  is  true.  27
Suppose  Emily  ﬁnds  herself  in  precisely  this  predicament.  She  rationally 
believes  that  Proof  Chauvinism  is  true.  Later,  she  reﬂects  on  the  Pythagorean 
Theorem,  a  statement  which  she’d  always  been  highly  conﬁdent  of,  but  never 
learned  how  to  prove.  She  notices  that  Proof  Chauvinism  recommends  that  she 
become  far  less  conﬁdent  of  this  alleged  theorem  until  she  can  prove  it.  Should 
she  remain  conﬁdent  in  it  or  not?  
Given  Emily’s  epistemic  fetishism,  it  is  clear  what  she’ll  do:  She’ll  reduce 
conﬁdence  in  the  theorem.  But  epistemically  speaking,  should  she  proceed  this 
way?  I  think  not.  Emily  should  ﬂout  Proof  Chauvinism’s  advice,  despite 
rationally  regarding  it  as  a  constraint  on  rationality.  Why? 
The  Proof  Chauvinist  allows  that  one’s  opinions  may  become  quite  a ccurate 
if  one  defers  to  reliable  sources  but  maintains  that  one’s  opinions  will  be less 
rational  for  such  accuracy-enhancing  deference.  In  light  of  this  strange  feature  of 
Proof  Chauvinism,  it  seems  to  me  that  Emily  should  instead  reason  as  follows: 
If  I  remain  conﬁdent  in  the  Pythagorean  Theorem,  my  opinion  will  probably  be  less 
rational,  but  more  accurate.  If  I  reduce  conﬁdence,  my  opinion  will  be  more  rational, 
but  probably  less  accurate.  I  don’t  care  about  being  rational;  I  care  about  being  right. 
So  I  will  remain  conﬁdent. 
Though  it  was  suggested  that  epistemic  akrasia  “makes  li le  sense  from  the 
inside,”  in  the  imagined  situation,  the  foregoing  reasoning  seems  quite  sensible. 
Given  a  conﬂict  between  what  one  considers  ‘more  rational’  and  what  one 
considers  ‘more  accurate,’  my  inclination  is  to  say  that,  if  one  is  rational,  one  will 
27 Titelbaum  (2015)  argues  against  the  possibility  of  this  sort  of  case.  But  his  argument 
assumes  that  epistemic  akrasia  is  irrational,  which  is  precisely  what  I’m  angling  to  deny.  So  there’s 
something  of  a  dialectical  stalemate  here:  He  takes  the  irrationality  of  epistemic  akrasia  as  a 
premise  and  uses  it  to  establish  what  he  calls  the  “ﬁxed  point  thesis,”  whereas  I  am—in  describing 
the  case  as  I  have—taking  the  falsity  of  the  ﬁxed  point  thesis  as  a  premise  and  using  it  to  establish 
the  possibility  of  rational  epistemic  akrasia.  His P → Q  is  my  ¬ Q →¬ P .  Each  of  us  rejects  the  other’s 
starting  point,  but,  strictly  speaking,  the  inferences  we  draw  are  compatible  with  one  another. 
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favor  accuracy.  So,  in  the  end,  I  think  that  if  Emily  were  rational,  she  would 
believe  the  Pythagorean  Theorem  and  regard  herself  as  irrational  for  so 
believing.  If  this  is  right,  then  an  agent  like  Emily  can  run  afoul  of  epistemic  28
rationality.  And  so  rational  norms  turn  out  not  to  be  rationally  executable. 
In  response,  though,  one  might  appeal  to  a  version  of  the  thought  we 
considered  much  earlier—that  ‘should’  sometimes  admits  of  multiple  readings. 
Sure,  perhaps  there  is  a  sense  in  which  Emily  should  ﬂout  Proof  Chauvinism.  But 
even  so,  it  doesn’t  follow  that  there’s  no  sense  in  which  Emily  would  be 
irrational  to  proceed  this  way—simultaneously  believing  Proof  Chauvinism  to  be 
true  while  disregarding  its  advice.  On  this  picture,  the  question  “What  should 
Emily  believe?”  has  no  single  correct  answer.  There  may  be  two  varieties  of 
rationality  at  play  here,  one  which  can  require  akrasia  and  one  which  forbids  it. 
I  am  sympathetic  to  the  general  suggestion  that  there  might  not  be  just  one 
species  of  rationality.  But  I  dispute  the  speciﬁc  contention  that  it  would  be 
irrational,  in  some  important  sense,  for  Emily  to  ﬂout  Proof  Chauvinism’s 
recommendations.  To  see  why,  it’s  useful  to  consider  why  one  might  think  that 
epistemic  akrasia  is  problematic  in  the  ﬁrst  place.  What’s  wrong  with  epistemic 
akrasia?  Horowi   provides  what  seems  to  me  a  compelling  story.  Why  is  it  bad 
to  believe  something  of  the  form  “ p ,  but  my  belief  in p  is  irrational”?  It’s  bad 
because,  generally  speaking,  rational  beliefs  are likely  to  be  true .  By  endorsing  an 
akratic  package,  you  commit  yourself  to  something  of  the  form,  “ p ,  but  my  belief 
in p  is  unlikely  to  be  true”  (pp.  738–740).  This  suggestion  is  corroborated  by  Alex 
Worsnip  (2018),  who  endorses  something  very  close  to  an  anti-akrasia  norm. 
Notice  how  similarly  he  motivates  his  principle:  “As  such,  to  believe  while 
judging  oneself  to  lack  suﬃcient  evidence  amounts  to  holding  that p  is  true,  but 
also  isn’t  especially  likely—in  light  of  all  the  available  information—to  be  true” 
(p.  17).  If  this  is  the  motivation  for  positing  an  anti-akrasia  principle,  then  the 
Proof  Chauvinism  case  is  the  one  type  of  situation  where  we’d  expect  the 
principle  not  to  apply.  So  I  think  it’s  diﬃcult  to  resist  the  intuitive  verdict  elicited 
by  the  case,  even  if  one  is  open  to  the  thought  that  there  might  be  multiple 
rational  norms,  which  can  come  into  conﬂict  with  one  another.  
All  of  this  indicates  that  rational  norms  turn  out  not  to  be  rationally 
28  Compare  Horowi   (2014,  pp.  735–740),  Christensen  (2016,  pp.  413–416).  
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executable  after  all.  An  agent  like  Emily,  who  cares  only  about  being  a  rational 
believer,  can  still  end  up  believing  irrationally.  If  this  is  right,  then—barring  the 
discovery  of  an  alternative  followability  standard  not  considered  here—rational 
norms  are  not  themselves  followable  in  any  distinctive  sense.  At  best,  they  are 
merely  trackable—a  standard  which  the  opaque  norm  meets  also.  Since 
conforming  to  the  translucent  norm  necessarily  involves  conforming  to  rational 
norms,  it  seems  that  the  translucent  and  opaque  norms  are,  with  respect  to 
followability,  in  the  same  boat. 
 
5.5 Applying  What  We’ve  Learned 
So...  what  lessons  should  be  drawn  from  all  of  this?  To  conclude  our  discussion 
of  followability,  it  will  be  useful  to  return  to  the  case  of  Frances  to  apply  what 
we’ve  learned. 
According  to  the  opaque  norm,  Frances  is  required  to  tell  the  lie  despite  the 
fact  that  her  evidence  suggests  that  she  should  do  the  opposite.  The  complaint 
against  this  picture  was  that  it  makes  morality  unfollowable.  Frances  certainly 
could  succeed  in  conforming  with  the  opaque  norm  (and  most  in  her  shoes 
probably  would),  but  if  she  does  so,  it  would  only  be  because she  happens  to  care 
about  the  right  things  (in  this  case,  protecting  her  friend).  So  unless  you’ve  solved 
ethics,  you’d  be er  hope  that  you,  too,  care  about  the  right  things,  if  you  wish  to 
conform  to  the  opaque  norm  consistently.  This  doesn’t  seem  to  provide  the  right 
sort  of  guidance.  
In  response,  we  considered  an  alternative,  the  translucent  norm,  which 
promised  to  be  more  followable  than  its  opaque  rival.  But  given  the  preceding 
discussion,  it’s  not  clear  that  it  can  be.  Why  not?  To  follow  the  translucent  norm, 
one  had  be er  be  able  to  conform  to  the  norms  of  (epistemic)  rationality.  But 
how  diﬃcult  is  that?  If  the  translucent  norm  is  to  enjoy  a  relevant  advantage,  it 
had  be er  not  be  the  case  that  the  norms  of  rationality  turn  out  to  be  on  a 
followability  par  with  the  opaque  norm. 
But  that’s  precisely  what  I’ve  argued.  Cases  of  rational  epistemic  akrasia 
show  that  the  norms  of  epistemic  rationality  are,  in  a  way,  quite  like  the  opaque 
norm.  In  the  case  of  Emily,  for  example,  the  norms  of  epistemic  rationality 
require  her  to  maintain  belief  in  the  Pythagorean  Theorem  despite  the  fact  that 
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her  evidence  suggests  that  she  should  do  otherwise.  (Note  the  parallel  with  the 
opaque  norm  in  the  case  of  Frances.)  Emily  certainly  could  succeed  in 
conforming  with  this  epistemic  norm  (and  most  in  her  shoes  probably  would), 
but  if  she  does  so,  it  would  only  be  because she  happens  to  care  about  the  right 
things  (in  this  case,  truth).  Her  evidence  suggested  that  she  should  prioritize 
believing-for-the-right-reasons  over  accuracy.  But  rationality  requires  her  to  aim 
at  accuracy  anyway.  The  very  same  complaints  about  followability  that  seemed 
to  plague  the  opaque  norm  arise  equally  here. 
The  foregoing  discussion  can  be  seen  as  posing  a  challenge  to  proponents  of 
the  translucent  norm.  If  the  translucent  norm  is  to  be  relevantly  more  followable 
than  the  opaque  norm,  then  it  had  be er  be  the  case  that  epistemic  norms 
themselves  are  relevantly  more  followable  than  the  opaque  norm.  The  challenge 
is  to  identify  a  standard  of  followability  that  diﬀerentiates  them.  If  this  challenge 
cannot  be  met,  then  we  can  extract  the  following  moral.  If  one  really  wants  to  put 
forward  a  norm  which  proves  to  be  more  followable  than  the  opaque  norm,  the 
proposed  norm  had  be er  not  appeal  directly  to  epistemic  rationality  in  the  way 
the  translucent  norm  does.  Once  epistemic  norms  have  been  invoked,  one  has 
given  up  the  game. 
Here  is  one  last  takeaway,  framed  in  perhaps  a  more  positive  light. 
Throughout  this  discussion,  we  have  assumed  that,  sometimes,  what  is  in  fact 
epistemically  (or  morally)  important  can  come  apart  from  what  it’s  rational  to 
believe  is  epistemically  (or  morally)  important.  In  the  epistemic  case,  we’ve  seen 
that  an  epistemically  rational  agent  will  be  resolutely  aimed  at  truth:  that  is,  she’ll 
endeavor  to  believe  what’s  true  even  when  she  believes  that  she  is  rationally 
required  to  do  something  else.  If  the  moral  case  functions  similarly,  then  a 
morally  good  agent  will  be  resolutely  aimed  at  whatever  is  in  fact  morally 
valuable  (kindness,  justice,  etc.):  she’ll  endeavor  to  promote  and  pursue  these 
things  even  when  she  believes  she  is  morally  required  to  do  something  else.  In 
the  epistemic  case,  it’s  not  obvious  that  there  is  any  followability  issue.  If  this  is 
so,  and  if  the  analogy  is  to  be  trusted,  then,  contrary  to  appearances,  there  may 
not  be  any  followability  issue  in  the  moral  case  either,  and  the  sort  of 
followability  demanded  by  translucence  should  not  move  us. 
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6 Conclusion 
Initially,  it  might  have  seemed  that  the  translucent  norm  strikes  the  perfect 
balance  between  unappealing  extremes.  On  one  end,  the  transparent  norm 
makes  compliance  easy  but  worthless.  On  the  other  end,  the  opaque  norm  makes 
compliance  valuable  but  quite  diﬃcult  to  a ain.  The  translucent  norm  occupies  a 
seeming  middle  ground  between  these  norms—a  potential  Goldilocks  approach. 
But  as  we’ve  seen,  it  is  hard  to  make  the  case  that  the  translucent  norm  improves 
upon  the  opaque  norm  in  any  appreciable  way.  The  translucent  norm  doesn’t 
track  what  a  good  person  would  do  as  faithfully  as  the  opaque  norm  does,  and 
despite  appearances,  it  is  no  more  followable  than  the  opaque  norm  is.  If  these 
are  the  only  two  relevant  dimensions,  the  opaque  norm  seems  to  outperform  its 
translucent  rival.  
To  conclude,  it  is  worth  connecting  these  observations  to  something  that  has 
been  largely  absent  from  the  discussion—blame.  Earlier,  we  set  forth  two 
important  roles  we  wanted  subjective  moral  norms  to  play.  In  focusing  on  just 
these  two  roles,  one  might  have  thought  that  we  neglected  to  consider  an 
important  third  role  for  subjective  moral  norms: to  delineate  those  acts  for  which  a 
person  cannot  aptly  be  blamed  or  criticized .  This  is  certainly  an  important  role.  But  it 
is  a  mistake,  I  think,  to  construe  this  blame  role  as  existing  independently  of  the 
two  roles  we  concentrated  on  throughout  our  discussion.  To  play  the  blame  role 
eﬀectively,  it  is  plausible  that  a  norm  should  both  ( i )  track  what  a  good  person 
would  do  (since  bad  people  do  blameworthy  things,  and  good  people  don’t)  and 
( ii )  be  followable  in  such  a  way  that  makes  it  fair  to  expect  someone  to  conform 
to  it  (since  this  perhaps  makes  it  fair  to  blame  someone  for  not  doing  so).  If  all  of 
this  is  right,  then  a  norm  will  be  capable  of  playing  the  blame  role  to  the  extent 
that  it  can  play  the  character  and  followability  roles.  Since  the  opaque  norm  has 
outperformed  the  translucent  norm  with  respect  to  these,  the  opaque  norm 
seems  be er  positioned  to  track  blameless  conduct.  Initially,  one  might  have 
thought  that,  if  anyone  would  be  free  from  blame,  it  would  be  a  perfectly 
rational,  maximally  conscientious  agent.  But  as  things  currently  stand,  this  seems 
not  to  be  the  case.  29
29 For  comments  that  improved  the  paper,  I  would  like  to  acknowledge Nomy  Arpaly,  Bob 
Beddor,  Ben  Blumson,  Anna  Brinkerhoﬀ,  David  Builes,  Harry  Chalmers,  Keith  DeRose,  Jamie 
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